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In Constitutional Law as Fiction, L.H. LaRue examines the art of
storytelling in the law. Because his book seeks to read the law as an "example
of literary fiction" (p. 2), LaRue argues that it should be classified as part of
a unique area of scholarship called "law and rhetoric" (p. 3).' According to
LaRue, judicial opinions are, in large part, stories. Thus, LaRue does not
advance a normative claim about the degree to which rhetoric should inhabit
legal texts;2 rather, he describes the law as essentially a rhetorical enterprise.
LaRue's thesis is that the stories in legal opinions are composed not solely of
facts but of fictions. A fiction, LaRue claims, is commonly defined as "a story
about something that didn't really happen" (p. 13).4 By masquerading as facts,
fictions can increase the persuasiveness of a narrative. Fictions thus serve as
an essential component of our legal system (p. 8): "Without persuasion, law
could not be law," LaRue notes, "and without fiction, there would be no
persuasion" (p. 11).
In an interesting and complex discussion, LaRue analyzes the difficulty in
drawing the boundaries between fact and fiction. "[M]ost discourse is in part
fictional" (p. 13), and all stories are composed of both fact and fiction (p. 14).
Fictions "fill in gaps" in our narratives and plug the holes in our empirical
evidence (p. 20). In addition, we can create fictions by the way we craft our
* Class of 1958 Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
I. LaRue's book is not novel enough to be set apart in a separate scholarly domain. LaRue's "law and
rhetoric" field actually fits squarely into the law-and-literature movement. While LaRue's book does not
analyze the insights that works of literature can bring to law, it does make claims similar to those made
by proponents of law-as-literature, who analyze how literary theory can be applied to legal texts. For an
introduction to these arguments, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 269-316 (1988); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE:
A HERMENEUrTiC READER 155 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
2. Some commentators have argued that style and rhetoric play an essential role in judicial opinions.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 26 (Fred
B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1931) (arguing that form is indispensable to substance of judicial opinions);
RICHARD vEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 9 (1992)
("[D]isjunction of form and substance in the opinion brings a relatively quick reversal.").
3. James Boyd White also views law as a branch of rhetoric. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric,
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 684 (1985).
4. LaRue does not offer clear definitions for "fact" or "fiction." Instead, he uses this definition of
fiction as a starting point and then exposes the inadequacy of any definition that assumes a dichotomy
between fact and fiction.
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narratives; when we select and order the facts, we erect an artificial
construction of reality that can be incomplete or misleading. For LaRue, there
is no strict dichotomy between fact and fiction because all stories are produced
at least partly from our imagination (p. 13).
After establishing the framework from which he plans to analyze the law,
LaRue launches into a literary exegesis of numerous constitutional opinions,
including the Dred Scott case,5 Everson v. Board of Education,6 and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,7 exposing the fictions in their narratives. But
most of the book centers on what LaRue characterizes as the two fundamental
stories of constitutional law: Marbury v. Madison8 and McCulloch v.
Maryland.9 LaRue proceeds to dissect the opinions, both authored by Chief
Justice Marshall, exposing the Justice's rhetorical tactics and separating the
narratives from the theoretical legal arguments. For example, in his explication
of McCulloch, LaRue demonstrates how Marshall uses a fiction-"that judges
stand above the fray and thus can bring peace" (p. 73)-to compose a narrative
that validates Marshall's interpretation of the Constitution as a flexible
document designed for an evolving society (pp. 89-90). Thus, LaRue uses the
storytelling of Chief Justice Marshall to strengthen his own claims about how
fictions perform the essential task of persuasion.
LaRue's thesis, on a purely descriptive level, fails to propound any novel
claims. Several scholars have explicated legal opinions as literary texts.1°
Numerous scholars have exposed the powerful effects of narrative and rhetoric
in law." Other scholars have viewed law as a struggle between narratives,
often resulting in the exclusion of outsider discourse.' 2 Thus, the claim that
judicial opinions are narratives, undergirded by contestable assumptions, is
nothing new. To push the field further, LaRue needs to develop the evaluative
component of his thesis. Recognizing that merely excavating fictions is not
"very profound criticism" (p. 26), LaRue declares that certain stories can be
appraised as superior to others (p. 14). Accordingly, LaRue not only exposes
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
7. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. See, e.g., WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 16-22 (analyzing Justice Cardozo's creativity of style,
framing of facts, and persuasiveness of rhetoric); Levinson, supra note 1, at 164-65 (depicting Chief Justice
Marshall's constitutional exegesis as creative, rather than merely interpretive, enterprise); Mark Tushnet,
The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 297-306 (1992) (presenting examples of
rhetoric in Supreme Court opinions).
11. See sources cited supra notes 1-3.
12. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 284 (1994) ("Arguments
about law are, in effect, arguments about which stories should be privileged."); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1934
(1991) (examining Supreme Court opinions to show instances when Justices "either wrote unaware of the
[outsider] narrative or simply ignored it").
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the fictions in the opinions he explicates, but he openly evaluates these fictions
as well.
Unfortunately, LaRue's own evaluation fails to account for the difficulties
and ambiguities raised in his initial discussion of storytelling. For example,
LaRue warns of the dangers of creating fictions about legislative intent:
I would like to point out the recurrence of fictions about "intent." I
have described in this book how Black, Marshall, Taney, and Miller
have written such fictions. So long as judges need to ask-what were
they trying to do when they wrote-then so long will such dangerous
fictions be written (p. 108).
Yet LaRue fails to explain why these fictions are dangerous rather than merely
erroneous. In addition, LaRue commits the same intellectual crime for which
he indicts judges, delving into the minds of the Justices he critiques, ascribing
motives to them, and determining their sincerity. According to LaRue, Justice
Black "obviously believe[d] his story" about religion in Everson (p. 21); Chief
Justice Marshall should not be accused of lying "since he is totally sincere"
(pp. 56-57); and Chief Justice Marshall was afraid "that we will forget what
the framers knew about drafting a constitution and that forgetting would be a
disaster" (p. 84). What makes LaRue's assessments of judicial intent any less
"dangerous" than the Justices' "fictions" about legislative motivation?
LaRue's failure to practice what he preaches results in even more
formidable complications in his argument. Although he observes that there can
be no clear division between fact and fiction, LaRue's evaluation turns on a
sharp dichotomy between the two. In one passage, LaRue condemns Justice
Black's historical account of religion in American society in Everson as a
harmful fiction because it unfairly characterizes religion as a fearsome threat
to democratic society (p. 26). LaRue then relates his own historical narrative,
providing examples of the positive influences that religion has had in our
society. Although LaRue states that evaluation must not always concern the
veracity of stories, his own criticisms merely expose the inaccuracies in
Black's history. While LaRue had earlier attempted to blur the line between
fact and fiction, his method of separating the good fictions from the bad often
appears to be nothing more sophisticated than determining whether the stories
comport with his version of the facts.
But can the fictions of storytelling ever be neatly extricated from the facts?
According to Stanley Fish, "facts are always 'achieved' . . . [by] partisan
urging of some ideological vision."' 3 What, then, are "facts"? Is everything
13. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 156
(1994).
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just a "fiction"? 14 Perhaps judicial opinions do not just contain fictions, but
rather are fictions in their entirety. LaRue comes closest to addressing this
problem toward the book's end, where he notes that good stories have a
"complicated and indirect relationship to facts" (p. 125), that fictions can have
truth in them, and that some stories "fit the evidence better than others"
(p. 129). These fragmentary musings, however, fail to provide a compelling
grounding for his own evaluative method. LaRue cannot justify why his
interpretation of the "facts" is any less fictional than the fictions he uncovers.
Occasionally, LaRue admits that he is engaging in the process of fiction-
creation. After supplying a historical context for Marbury v. Madison, LaRue
pauses to ask: "Is my story a fiction?" (p. 44). However, he concludes that he
is in a legitimate and authoritative position to evaluate: "[I]n part I can judge,
since I do know something about how history is done, and I know something
about the fuzziness of the line between fact and fiction" (p. 44). But his self-
reflexiveness is not rigorous enough. A mere series of concessions of his own
storytelling does not convince the reader that his storytelling is better or more
accurate than that of others.
Because LaRue's "stories" about the narratives employed in legal opinions
are also composed of fictions, LaRue must supply a reason why the reader
should privilege his narratives over those told by judges. How do we select
between two narratives, each advocating its own version of the facts? How do
we avoid employing our own fictions when evaluating other fictions? As Jane
Baron argues, "All evaluation ... proceeds from a particular and contingent,
although often unacknowledged, perspective; it always starts from a contestable
point of view."' 15 Or, as Kim Lane Scheppele aptly notes, "Stories may
diverge ... not because one is true and another false, but rather because they
are both self-believed descriptions coming from different points of view
informed by different background assumptions about how to make sense of
events."16
The problem of how to legitimate certain interpretations of facts over
others underlies the difficulty of evaluating competing stories. A fact (or text)
can have a multitude of "correct" interpretations. 17 In fact, LaRue correctly
observes that "[m]ost events have more than one meaning, all simultaneously
both partially true and partially false" (p. 26). If multiple interpretations can
be equally true, however, how can we distinguish among them? If we cannot
14. These issues pervade the work of Jorge Luis Borges, who brilliantly examines the complicated
relationship between fiction and reality in several of his short stories, poems, and essays. See, e.g., JORGE
Luis BORGES, LABYRINTHS (Donald A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., 1964).
15. Baron, supra note 12, at 270 (citations omitted).
16. Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2082 (1989).
17. See STANLEY FiSH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 327 (1980) ("Interpretation is not the art
of construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them.").
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evaluate on the basis of the truth of an interpretation, then we need to find
another way of defending why we adopt certain interpretations over others.
Commentators have taken several interesting positions on this issue. James
Boyd White maintains that the law creates a "rhetorical community" by
creating an open forum "in which one point of view, one construction of
language and reality, is tested against another."' 8 Essentially, White asserts
that the legal process, in which different interpretations compete and interact,
can serve as a fair method for resolving how stories should be evaluated. Other
commentators criticize the process by which law accomplishes this task. Toni
Massaro, for example, contends that, because "all stories cannot dominate," the
narratives of more powerful groups will conquer those of marginalized
groups. 19 Richard Delgado argues that "[n]ew stories are always interpreted
and judged in terms of the old."20 As a result, "[m]ajoritarian tools of
analysis, themselves only stories, inevitably will pronounce outsider versions
lacking in typicality, rigor, generalizability, and truth.",2' LaRue virtually
ignores these problems in evaluating interpretations. Although his own
historical and critical narratives hinge on a particular interpretation of the facts,
LaRue fails to justify his interpretation as superior to the ones he critiques.
Thus, nearing the end of LaRue's endeavor, the reader awaits LaRue's
theory about how he evaluates fictions. Throughout the book, however, LaRue
consistently evades answering this question, and in the last chapter, he finally
confesses that he will not supply a theory to justify his evaluation of fictions
(p. 148): "If it is true that storytelling is one of the fundamental ways to
understand the world, then a good story does not need to be replaced by a
good theory; a good story can stand on its own . . ." (p. 149). But what is a
"good" story? LaRue merely begs the question. Because LaRue believes that
"the topic of storytelling in law is ... not the sort of practice about which
there can be a theory" (p. 148), he devotes most of the final chapter of his
book to discussing a narrative told by writer Norman Maclean and explaining
why it serves as an example of a "good" fiction (pp. 129-53).22 Thus, instead
of providing a theory and engaging the most difficult and interesting problems
of narratives, rhetoric, and legal interpretation, LaRue retreats into an
ineffective description of how Maclean tells stories.
Although his book has moments where he deftly navigates a complicated
universe of ambiguity between fact and fiction, LaRue frequently abandons this
vision for a rather simplistic form of criticism. Unwilling to confront the
18. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 266, 273 (1984).
19. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words. Old Wounds?,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2116 (1989).
20. Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REv.
665, 667 (1993).
21. Id. at 675.
22. The book LaRue discusses is NORMAN MACLEAN, YOUNG MEN AND FIRE (1992).
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pressing problems it raises, LaRue's book is merely an overtold story, a
narrative without sufficient critical self-awareness.
-Daniel J. Solove
